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Abstract  
Food safety standards have become stricter and are currently major barriers in the 
international agri-food trade. These standards negatively affect developing countries 
exports to markets in developed countries. We use tea exports from two major tea 
exporting developing countries, China and Sri Lanka, as an example to discuss the 
effects of standards on their tea supply chains. China and Sri Lanka share some 
similar characteristics in tea production and exports. First, we conduct a general 
comparison between the two countries’ tea exports based on port rejection data from 
UNIDO, and then we provide a detailed supply chain analysis. Finally, we 
summarize our work and discuss the policy implications. 
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1. Introduction 
Although tariffs are being reduced, there is increasing concern in the 
international agri-food trade around food safety standards, especially sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) measures (Disdier et al. 2008; Henson and Humphrey 2010). From 
2002 to 2013, the number of World Trade Organization (WTO)/SPS notifications for 
agri-food products (HS01-HS24) increased from 410 to 6551. The increasing number of 
SPS notifications for agri-food products implies that the importing countries are paying 
increasing attention to food safety and are implementing stricter standards for imports. 
This change has hindered agri-food exports, particularly from developing countries to 
developed countries (Otsuki and Wilson 2001, Jongwanich 2009, Neeliah and 
Goburdhum 2010). 
Tea, which is a traditional economic crop that has been traded for centuries, is 
facing the same challenges. Tea is one of the most popular beverages worldwide and it 
has been exported from major tea producing countries, including the top four exporting 
countries China, India, Sri Lanka, and Kenya, since the 19th century. Although 
exporting tea has brought economic benefits to these developing countries through trade, 
the increasing food safety standards for tea have also brought challenges. Since 1996, 
                                                   
1 From the SPSIMS database at http://spsims.wto.org 
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the average import tariffs on tea have decreased; however, the number of SPS 
notifications for tea has grown (FAO IGG/Tea 2016). For example, Figure 1 from the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Intergovernmental Group on Tea (IGG/Tea) 
for a common SPS measure, maximal residue limits (MRLs), shows this trend clearly.  
In addition to the MRLs, other common food safety standards for the herbs and 
spices category to which tea belongs are bacterial contamination, labeling, hygienic 
conditions/controls, pesticide residues, adulteration/missing documents, additives, other 
contamination, heavy metals, packaging, veterinary drug residues, mycotoxins, and 
other items. Tables 1–4 show the frequency of reasons for rejection of herbs and spices 
in four major developed country/region markets. The tables list the top 15 exporters that 
received rejections from the four markets and the reasons for the rejections. The 
majority of the 15 countries that have their exports most frequently rejected from these 
four major export markets are developing countries. China and Sri Lanka, as two of the 
leading tea exporters, are both in the top 15 lists. 
As two major tea exporting countries in Asia, China and Sri Lanka face the 
challenges of food safety standards applied by all major tea-importing developed 
countries. To improve product quality and become more competitive in the international 
market, both countries have begun to set their own standards for tea. Other countries 
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that are pursuing this strategy include India and Kenya (FAO IGG/Tea 2016). For 
example, major tea producing and consuming countries have both set up MRLs based 
on their own criteria. These standards are equivalent to limits set by Codex 
Alimentarius. However, there are gaps between the MRLs of exporting countries and 
those of importing countries. The IGG/Tea has played a major role in setting MRLs for 
tea and reducing compliance costs. More details of the functions of the IGG/Tea and its 
interactions with various stakeholders in the international tea market are discussed later 
in the paper. 
This paper discusses the effects of food safety standards on tea exporting 
developing countries by reviewing previous empirical literature and conducting 
face-to-face field interviews and studies. Taking two developing countries that are 
major tea exporters with different characteristics and some similarities, we compare the 
differences between the two countries in responding to standards applied to tea by 
importing developed countries through tea supply chain analysis in each country. 
Section 2 reviews the literature and background to the challenges posed by standards; 
Sections 3 and 4 introduce the tea supply chains of China and Sri Lanka and how the 
standards affect these countries, respectively; and Section 5 concludes the paper by 
comparing the two countries tea supply chains and responses to standards. 
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2. Literature Review and Background 
There are a large number of studies on the impact of food safety standards on 
the exports of agri-food commodities from developing to developed countries. Most 
research found that food safety standards have larger impacts on agri-food exports than 
tariffs. Safety standards have negatively affected exports and particularly hindered 
developing countries’ access to developed countries’ markets (Otsuki and Wilson 2001, 
Disdier et al. 2008, Jongwanich 2009; Neelian and Goburdhum 2010, IDE-UNIDO 
2013). For example, Hunag and Gale (2006), Shan and Jiang (2005), and You and Cui 
(2006) found that China’s exports of vegetables, fruit, tea, aquatic products, and 
processed foods have not increased after accession to the WTO. Among many factors 
that may negatively affect China’s agricultural exports, food safety standards have been 
identified as one of the major barriers both in academic studies (Dong and Jenson 2004, 
Chen et al. 2008) and in policy making (MOFCOM 2009). 
Many studies have shown that various tea exports from China and Sri Lanka 
have been hindered by various food safety standards such as pesticide residue, MRLs, 
and TBT/SPS (Xu and Gao 2006, Gu et al. 2007, Sun et al. 2007, Jayaratne 2011, Wei 
et al. 2012, Perera 2014, Dong and Zhu 2015, FAO IGG/Tea 2016). These studies either 
conducted empirical analysis on tea trade data to quantify the effects of food safety 
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standards on trade flow reduction, or qualitatively analyzed problems and challenges in 
meeting standards. However, limited research has been done on the effects of standards 
on the tea trade supply chain, although meeting standards requires coordination among 
all the stakeholders along the supply chain.  
This paper fills the literature gap by examining the effects of food safety 
standards following supply chain analysis and comparing two leading developing 
countries that are tea exporters and discussing the general implications of the results. 
The key effects of food safety standards are identified in different situations for other 
developing countries for tea and other agri-food exports to developed countries markets. 
Using the port rejection data from UNIDO, we analyze the general situation for herb 
and spice exports from China and Sri Lanka to Australia, the European Union (EU), 
Japan, and the United States in this section.  
We focus on China and Sri Lanka for the following reasons. Major tea 
production countries are located in Asia and some parts of Africa, and China, India, Sri 
Lanka, Indonesia, and Kenya are the major producers. These top five producers 
accounted for 77% of world tea production and 80% of global exports in 2012 
(Majumder 2012). Over the last two decades, India has lost its leading tea export 
position to Sri Lanka, Kenya, and China. This paper focuses mainly on Asian tea 
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exports because of their similar production and market background. Therefore, we 
picked the top two tea exporters in Asia: China and Sri Lanka. Both countries are also 
major tea consuming countries (FAO IGG/Tea 2016) and have set up their own food 
safety standards and quality measures for tea products. In addition, China and Sri Lanka 
mainly produce orthodox tea, whereas other countries, such as India and Kenya, 
produce crush, tear, curl (CTC) tea. Understanding the gap or difference between 
standards of importing and exporting countries helps to clarify the effects of standards 
imposed by developed importing countries.  
Based on the port rejection data from UNIDO, we focused on herb and spice 
exports, the main product of which is tea, from China and Sri Lanka to the markets of 
four major developed countries. Detailed data about tea are difficult to obtain, although 
it was possible to conduct general analysis from the general data about herbs and spices. 
Both China and Sri Lanka are in the 15 exporters whose products were most frequently 
rejected from the four markets. For the Australian market from 2003 to 2013, herb and 
spice products from China were rejected 170 times, and China was ranked as number 2, 
whereas products from Sri Lanka were rejected 46 times, and Sri Lanka was ranked as 
number 4 (Table 1). The Chinese and Sri Lankan products were mainly rejected because 
of labeling problems, although there were also problems with bacterial contamination 
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and adulteration/missing documents. Labeling and adulteration problems are usually 
considered to be management issues, whereas bacterial contamination is a food safety 
standard problem, although labeling may also be in some cases. Chinese and Sri Lankan 
products were rejected at 13 and 12 times, respectively, due to this standard. Table 5 
shows more information about Australian import rejections. On average, for every 1 
million US dollars of herbs and spices imported to Australia in the time period, products 
from China, which accounted for about 12.67% of Australia’s average total herb and 
spice imports, were rejected 2.56 times. Sri Lanka had a smaller import share at 2.29%, 
although the average rejection frequency per million US dollars was higher at 4.52. The 
situation improved from 2003 and 2004, although further efforts to reduce rejections are 
still needed. 
For the EU market from 2002 to 2013, herb and spice products from China 
were rejected 97 times, and China was ranked as number 5, whereas Sri Lankan 
products were rejected 20 times, and Sri Lanka was ranked as number 15 (Table 2). The 
Chinese products were rejected because of additives and Sri Lankan products were 
rejected because of mycotoxins. In addition, products were also rejected for bacterial 
contamination. These are food safety standard problems. Products from China had a 
better average performance with an 11.60% market share at a detention rate per million 
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US dollars of 0.06 (Table 6). Sri Lanka had 1.15% of the market share at a detention 
rate per million US dollars of 0.14.  
For the Japanese market from 2006 to 2013, herb and spice products from 
China were rejected 65 times, and China was ranked number 2, whereas Sri Lankan 
products were rejected 18 times, and Sri Lanka was ranked number 4 (Table 3). The 
Chinese products were rejected mostly because of pesticide residues, additives, and 
mycotoxins, which are all food safety standard compliance problems. Sri Lankan 
products were rejected mostly due to mycotoxins, which is also a food safety standard 
problem. China had a better average performance than Sri Lanka, with 53.91% market 
share and a detention rate per million US dollars of 0.05 (Table 7). Sri Lanka had 0.16% 
of the market share at a detention rate per million US dollars of 4.11. Because of its big 
market share in Japan, China has made efforts to comply with the food safety standards 
applied by Japan. 
For the US market from 2002 to 2013, herb and spice products from China 
were rejected 245 times in total, and China was ranked number 7, whereas Sri Lankan 
products were rejected 134 times, and Sri Lanka was ranked number 13 (Table 4). The 
Chinese products were rejected due to hygienic conditions, labeling, bacterial 
contamination, and pesticide residues, whereas Sri Lankan products were rejected due 
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to bacterial contamination, labeling, and hygienic conditions. These are mainly food 
safety standard compliance problems. China had a 13.28% of market share with a 
detention rate per million US dollars of 0.13, whereas Sri Lanka had 1.24% of the 
market share with a detention rate per million US dollars of 0.73 (Table 8).  
General analysis of Chinese and Sri Lankan herb and spice exports to the 
markets of four major developed countries indicate that food safety standards are major 
problems for both countries. The analysis of the detention rate is not conclusive for the 
following reasons. 1) In addition to tea products, Sri Lanka also exports many spices 
included in the same category that cannot be separated in the available data. 2) Chinese 
exports have much larger absolute values than Sri Lankan exports in all markets. The 
smaller detention rate does not necessarily imply that China lost less than Sri Lanka in 
standards compliance issues. 3) China mainly exports mass produced tea leaves as 
intermediate products for further processing in destination markets, whereas Sri Lankan 
tea exports are mainly final refined tea products. This could also result in different 
detention rates per imported value. 4) For the Japanese market, many Japanese tea 
companies have been investing in China and produce tea following Japanese standards 
from ingredient selection to packaging. This may also explain the smaller detention rate 
for China compared with Sri Lanka in this market. Although the analysis using port 
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rejection data is not conclusive due to data limitations, it is still suggestive and reflects 
the challenges of food safety standards that China and Sri Lanka have been facing when 
exporting to markets in developed countries. 
Based on the macro-background analysis in this section, in Section 2, 
country-specific tea supply chain analyses are conducted for both China and Sri Lanka 
based on field investigations and face-to-face interviews with stakeholders in key 
stages. 
3. Tea Supply Chain in China  
As the largest tea producer in the world, China is the third largest tea exporter 
after Sri Lanka and Kenya. It has the longest history of tea production and consumption 
in the world, dating back to the 2nd century BC. The area of tea plantations has increased 
by 60% from 2003 to 2012, and the yield has increased from 8000 to 11,000 hg/ha (Lei 
2015). There are six types of tea produced in China, based on different fermentation 
levels, from white tea to black tea. These teas are produced mainly in southern China. 
The main tea producing provinces from south to north are Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, 
Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, and Jiangsu.  
About two third of China’s tea output is consumed domestically, mostly as 
green tea, which takes almost half of the domestic market share. Green tea is also the 
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main exported tea, and China is the largest green tea exporter globally. However, the 
export price of tea is much lower than the domestic price because in the domestic 
market, premium tea leaves are consumed as branded famous produce with 
geographical indications. However, the tea exported from China as mass-processed 
crude tea is supplied to larger international buyers, usually in developed countries. The 
Chinese tea market is polarized into domestic-oriented and export-oriented (Lei 2015) 
starting from the supply chain. 
The domestic supply chain has several distribution channels. The main players 
in the supply chain are farmers, processers, refineries, and branded tea companies. The 
domestic supply chain is short; the distance from the farm to the consumer is short 
because of the demand. In China, tea is considered as a cultural high-quality drink. 
Although there are relatively cheap, low-quality teas in the domestic market, most tea is 
considered an expensive drink and is used as an expensive gift in social settings. Hence, 
tea is embedded in local culture, and products with geographical indications from 
famous production regions are usually considered as the best. Local farmers can sell 
their tea leaves either directly to consumers through the internet or tea fairs and 
exhibitions, or they can sell to local processers. In addition to this short distribution 
channel, tea farmers can sell their fresh tea leaves or processed crude tea to processors, 
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refineries, or branded tea companies.  
The tea supply chain for exports is simple compared with the domestic supply 
chain. There are three or four players in the supply chain: farmers, processing factories, 
and refineries and/or exporters. Because most of the tea that China exports is 
mass-produced crude tea, tea farmers sell fresh tea leaves to primary processing 
factories to be proceed into crude tea. Crude tea is sold to refineries later, after selecting, 
sorting, and blending with other types of tea or the same tea from different harvests 
according to buyer’s requirements for the finished tea. Small refineries usually 
outsource exports of the finished products to trading companies. Large refineries that 
employ trade professionals and have an export license sell the finished tea directly to 
foreign buyers (intermediate companies or brand owners). 
Recently, China’s tea exports have displayed the following features according 
to Dong and Zhu (2015). First, although China’s tea production has been growing, the 
growth has been mainly driven by domestic consumption rather than exports. Second, 
the export price of Chinese tea is lower than that of other exporting countries. As 
mentioned in Section 2, China’s tea exports are mainly mass-produced crude tea leaves 
as ingredients for further processing; however, other competitors, especially Sri Lanka, 
are exporting branded fine tea as final products. Third, due to increasingly stringent 
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food safety standards, it has become more and more difficult to export tea to developed 
countries. China’s tea export destinations have been switching from developed countries 
to developing countries. Lastly, SPS measures have become the biggest obstacle for tea 
exports to developed countries markets. These developments imply that food safety 
standards have affected China’s tea access to developed countries market. 
The tea supply chain for exports has undergone the following changes to meet 
the standards and win market share. The tea supply chain for exports has been separated 
from the domestic supply chain because of government control of the tea sector before 
the 1970s, and tea exporting was fully liberalized in 1999. Thus, most of the players 
involved in tea exports are the previously state-owned ones. To maximize profit in the 
higher premium domestic market, some players in the export tea supply chain are 
exploring the domestic market. However, most are still focused on tea exports, and they 
only follow the requirements of importers and importing countries. Starting from 
farming (contract farming or buying tea leaves), processing, and refining, players from 
each stage closely follow the requirements of foreign buyers. These requirements 
include public standards applied by importing countries and the standards of the 
individual buyers. For example, Lipton requires all its material suppliers to have 
Rainforest Alliance certification. In addition, because China mainly exports 
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mass-produced crude tea as an ingredient, private standards, such as GlobalGAP and 
GlobalGMP, are required at a business-to-business level.  
The stricter food safety standards have crowded out small, less competitive 
players in the tea market, which is why initially only previously state owned factories or 
companies were involved in tea exports. However, because most Chinese tea exports are 
mass-produced crude tea, the export price is much lower than the domestic price. Many 
big companies that specialize in exports are considering engaging in domestic business. 
The standards to be followed and the production practices are different from those 
required for exports. This may share much capacity for the export business. Less effort 
could be devoted to creating value-added tea products for export. If producers do not 
add more value to exported tea products and face stricter food safety standards, the 
number of export businesses may decrease in the long run. 
In 2012, the eight-point code to cut bureaucracy and maintain close ties with 
the people was issued by the Chinese government. This eight-point code aimed to tackle 
corruption in bureaucracy. Once implemented, the domestic tea business suffered a 
major negative shock. Demand for high-quality premium tea, which is usually 
overpriced and used for gifting rather than consumption, dropped hugely. With this 
shock in the domestic tea market, the export business regained its popularity. However, 
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the general trend is still toward stricter food safety standards and Chinese exported tea 
has not added value in the international value chain. In addition, another major 
difficulty that the Chinese tea industry is facing in both domestic and export businesses 
is increasing labor costs owing to national salary increases. This challenge particularly 
affects tea exporters because they may lose their price advantage in the international 
market even for crude tea. Emerging tea exporting countries, such as Vietnam, are also 
gradually eroding the price advantage. 
4. Sri Lankan Tea Supply Chain 
Sri Lankan tea plantations date back to the British colonial period. It has the 
third largest area of tea cultivation (188.323 ha) after China and India. Sri Lanka 
produces orthodox black tea (91.8% of total production), CTC (6%), and green tea, 
instant, and other teas (2.2%) (Hemaratne 2016). There are seven tea regions in Sri 
Lanka with high, medium, and low production elevations: Kandy (medium); 
Nurawa-Eliya (high); Uda Pussellawa (low); Uva (high); Dimbula (high); 
Sabaragamuwa (low); and Ruhuna (low).  
According to Hemaratne (2016), Sri Lanka is the top tea export revenue earner, 
the largest value-added tea exporter, and the largest orthodox tea producer and exporter. 
The major destinations for Sri Lankan tea exports are the Commonwealth of 
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Independent States, Middle East, North America, Turkey, Ukraine, Japan, and China. 
About 43% of Sri Lankan tea exports are bulk, 47% are packaged, 7% are in tea bags, 
1% are instant tea, and 2% are green tea. Most Sri Lankan tea is exported, and the 
domestic market consumes only about 2–3% of the tea production and is mainly low 
quality. Exported Sri Lankan tea is the highest quality Ceylon tea. Recently, the major 
export destinations for Sri Lanka of Russia and the Middle East have been facing 
economic difficulties, and Sri Lanka is trying to diversify its export markets.  
Next, we examine the Sri Lankan tea industry supply chain in greater detail. 
There are five players in the tea supply chain: growers, fresh leaf dealers, tea factories, 
brokers, and exporters. In addition, the government-run Sri Lanka Tea Board and The 
Tea Research Institute (TRI) also play important roles in the tea sector. Growers in the 
Sri Lankan tea supply chain are charge of new planting, replanting, and growing tea. 
There are three types of tea growers: tea small holders (usually family farms with less 
than 4.4 ha), tea estate owners (over 10 ha that hire labors), corporate sector plantations 
(over 100 ha with a resident work force), and government sector plantations (such as 
TRI with a resident work force). In the growing stage, all growers, irrespective of size 
or ownership, follow the good agriculture practice (GAP) standard issued by TRI, which 
adds value at this stage. 
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Green leaf dealers have licenses from the Sri Lanka Tea Board. They collect 
fresh green leaves from farmers and supply the leaves to tea factories. The price they 
pay the farmers is based on the factory net sale average and the dealers keep 1% for 
commission and transportation costs. The green leaf dealers follow the Tea Control Act 
No. 51 of 1957, which regulates their mode of transport, quality of leaves, distance from 
farm to factory, time duration, payments, and so on. Most green leaf dealers hire 
experienced tea experts who can determine the quality of tea well. The value added at 
this stage is the prompt transport of undamaged leaves.  
Next, the tea manufactures convert the fresh green tea leaves into tea. There are 
three types of manufacturer: private sector manufacturers (450 companies) that buy 
from leaf processors; corporate sector manufacturers (250 companies) that own leaf 
processors; and state-owned tea factories (10 companies) that own leaf processors but 
also buy from leaf processors. To improve performance, tea factories add value through 
GAP, good processing practice, and selecting the highest quality tea leaves.  
The tea is auctioned by brokers that are Sri Lanka Tea Board-accredited agents 
of all tea manufacturers (sellers in this case) for cataloguing tea, quality assurance, 
warehousing, selling at auction, and remitting sales. These licensed produce brokers are 
auctioneers who are regulated under the Licensing of Produce Brokers Act No. 9 of 
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1979. There are eight selling brokers in Sri Lanka dealing with eight tea catalogues. The 
value added at this stage is through quality control. 
The final stage in the supply chain is the buyers. The buyers sort, blend, add 
value, pack, and export teas. Buyers can be registered exporters of tea, registered 
packers of tea, and local dealers. The size of the exporters is determined by the volume 
of exports. The exporters follow the Tax and Control of Exports Act No. 16 of 1959. 
They are subject to quality control at pre-auction, pre-shipment, and pre- and 
post-import. Registered tea packers pack exports and a small amount for local sale. The 
packing business also follows Regulation 1986 and the labeling law under the Foods 
Act No. 26 of 1980. Buyers can also be local dealers who run 100% local wholesale and 
retail businesses. In the buyer stage, value is added through product diversification with 
quality teas. 
In addition, the Sri Lanka Tea Board and TRI play major roles in the tea 
industry. The Sri Lanka Tea Board is a government body in charge of regulating, 
promoting, and assisting the development of the tea industry in Sri Lanka. They license 
manufacturers of tea and brokers for the auctions. All exporters are required to register 
with The Sri Lanka Tea Board and are regularly inspected by officers. Exporters are 
required to follow good processing practices. The Tea Small Holding Development 
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Authority under The Sri Lanka Tea Board oversees the development of small holders 
who are responsible for about 70% of the production in the country. For development, 
The Sri Lanka Tea Board provides subsidies for replanting tea plants and for fertilizers. 
They also provide assistance for brand building by the exporters and extension services 
such as seminars and workshops to teach farmers about production practices.  
For quality control, The Sri Lanka Tea Board has tea testers who test the teas 
prior to auctions to remove teas that do not meet their standards. Typically, about 
0.1–0.2% of teas are rejected at this point, mainly due to storage problems and 
contamination. Teas that are meant for the export market are required to comply with 
ISO 37202. The Sri Lanka Tea Board follows the strictest values for MRLs (which are 
usually from the EU) and they issue the domestic registered trade mark for Ceylon tea, 
the Lion logo. They also have an ozone logo which indicates the ozone-friendliness of 
Ceylon tea according to the Montreal Protocol. The Sri Lanka Tea Board also registers 
geographical indications for the seven growing regions and requires tea factories to have 
ISO22000. 
Because of the economic difficulties facing the traditional big buyers of Sri 
Lankan tea, the Sri Lanka Tea Board is under pressure to explore new markets. 
                                                   
2 ISO 3720 was first introduced in 1986. The current version is 2011 one. There is 
another ISO standard for green tea, which is ISO 11287:2011. 
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Currently about 40% of Ceylon teas are for brands, including about 100 local brands 
and big buyers such as Hama from Turkey and Unilever (Lipton).  
The TRI, which performs research and development, is another key player in 
the Sri Lankan tea industry. The TRI aims to apply the strictest standards, establish 
testing methods for MRL, and makes suggestions to the Tea Board when they regularly 
conduct tests for issuing quality certification or accrediting. According to the TRI, about 
90% of the concerns that tea importers have are with agricultural chemical residues. As 
a tea producing country, Sri Lanka relies on imports of pesticides and fertilizers to 
produce tea. Imports of these chemicals are controlled by the registration of pesticides 
in the Ministry of Agriculture. To ensure that these chemicals meet the strictest MRLs, 
the TRI tests them, and once they meet all the export standards based on the importers 
requirements, the TRI approves the chemicals and recommends that the government can 
import them. If there are different standards set by different importers, the TRI follows 
the strictest standard. Hence, all the chemicals that are used in Sri Lankan tea 
production should satisfy the importers’ concerns about residues. Once a chemical is 
approved, the TRI teaches farmers how and when to use the pesticides or agricultural 
chemicals. 
When importers’ standards or requirements for tea are not feasible, the TRI 
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negotiates with the regulatory agencies in other countries to educate them about tea 
production in Sri Lanka so that the importing countries can set reasonable values for 
MRLs and other regulations. The TRI is closely involved with the FAO IGG/Tea 
through the Sri Lanka Tea Board and also sets the Sri Lankan version of GAP, which 
includes good agricultural practices, good processing practices, and markets three 
perspectives that corresponding players in the supply chain follow.  
Currently, the Sri Lankan tea industry is facing the following difficulties. 1) 
Standards compliance. Developed countries usually have the strictest standards that can 
be difficult to meet for both small and large players in the supply chain. Capacity limits 
are the barrier for the small players. For large players, it takes time and money to be 
compliant. For example, a tea estate with a resident work force obtained Rainforest 
Alliance certification in 2011 as requested by Unilever at a cost of 8 million Sri Lankan 
rupees. The certification required physical infrastructure investments, such as toilets and 
cleaning stations for chemical sprayers, and educating workers. There are 800 workers 
in the tea estate with their families, making 3200 residents in total. To obtain and keep 
the certification, the tea estate needs to ensure all 3200 people follow certain practices 
in their daily life. Education and changing mindsets and attitudes are difficult and 
expensive. In addition, Rainforest Alliance certification was not created for tea. There 
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are many control points that are not applicable to tea cultivation. Lastly, meeting these 
standards does not result in a price premium, although it is a requirement to stay in 
business. 2) Labor shortages and labor welfare problems. There is labor shortage in the 
tea sector. The current young generation does not want to work in the tea sector and are 
more attracted to other jobs in big cities. In addition, Sri Lankan trade unions are strong. 
They ask for wage rises every two years and frequently strike, which is particularly 
damaging to the tea sector because of the crop characteristics. 3) Exploration of new 
markets. As mentioned before, Sri Lanka is seeking market diversification.  
5. Comparison and Conclusion 
Based on the analysis of port rejection data for Chinese and Sri Lankan tea 
exports and their tea supply chains, we identified similarities and differences 
between these two leading tea exporting countries. Both countries have government 
involvement in the tea sector. However, the Chinese tea market has become more 
liberalized recently. The current government influence in the Chinese tea industry is 
mainly on the domestic market. The Sri Lankan tea sector is well controlled by the 
government. Every stage of the supply chain is regulated by the government. In 
particular, the government regulates quality control to ensure the competitiveness of 
Sri Lankan tea in export markets. The Chinese government may learn from this 
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example to regulate the standard compliance of the tea sector more closely. The tea 
sectors in both countries are also facing labor shortages. This may be true for the 
entire agriculture sector globally. Labor shortages include the inadequate labor 
supply and rising wages. Both problems must be tackled by the industry, other 
sectors, and the government. 
The differences between the tea sectors of the two countries are as follows. 
First, China exports mainly mass-produced crude tea, whereas Sri Lanka exports 
mainly branded fine tea. The importing countries and the sub-markets in each 
country are not the same; however, they both face strict food safety standards 
imposed by the importing countries. The standards include both public and private 
standards. Although there is no price premium, exporters in China and Sri Lanka 
must meet these standards to stay in business. Careful practices and efficient 
communication in every stage of the supply chain are needed for both countries. In 
addition, to explore more export opportunities and to gain more profit, Chinese tea 
exporters should learn from Sri Lanka to create more added value for their export 
products. The Chinese government should also take a greater lead in the 
inter-government negotiations for Chinese tea producers as producing countries 
discuss more efficient, better international industry standards with tea consuming 
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countries. 
The analysis of the effects of the food safety standards for Chinese and Sri 
Lankan tea exports provides a general picture of the current tea export business in 
developing countries. As the two major tea exporting countries at different positions 
in the international tea supply chain, China and Sri Lanka provide some general 
implications for other tea exporting developing countries to learn from. For example, 
how the governments can help in regulation (quality control), promotion, and 
inter-governmental negotiations to improve responses to stricter standards. 
Comparing China and Sri Lanka will also help other developing countries to 
identify their own problems and to search for solutions.  
Finally, to meet stricter food safety standards and to access more markets in 
developed countries, better quality control in each stage of the supply chain and 
better communication with importers and importing countries are necessary. 
Moreover, governments of developing countries should negotiate with importing 
countries, especially for products that the importing countries do not produce or 
produce different varieties of with different agricultural conditions, to make sure 
appropriate sustainable standards are jointly set. These suggestions also apply to 
general agri-food exports from developing countries to developed countries with 
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increasingly strict food safety standards.
26 
 
 
Reference 
Basu Majumder, A., Bera, B., & Rajan, A. (2010). Tea statistics: global scenario. Inc. J. 
Tea Sci, 8(1), 121-124. 
Disdier, A., Fontagné, L. And Mimouni, M. (2008). The impact of regulations on 
agricultural trade: Evidence from the SPS and TBT agreements. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 90: 336-350. 
Dong, F., & Jensen, H. H. (2004). The challenge of conforming to sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures for China's agricultural exports. 
Dong, Y., & Zhu, Y. (2015). Impact of SPS Measures Imposed by Developed Countries 
on China’s Tea Export-A Perspective of Differences in Standards. Applied Economics 
and Finance, 2(4), 160-169. 
FAO IGG/Tea. (2016). The effects of maximum residue levels in tea on international tea 
trade. Twenty-second Session. Naivasha, Kenya, 25-27 May 2016  
GU, G. and Niu, X. (2007). Empirical study on the impacts of technical barrier to trade 
on international trade – Taking tea trade between China and Japan as an example. 
Journal of International Trade 6:74-80. 
Henson, S., & Humphrey, J. (2010). Understanding the complexities of private 
standards in global agri-food chains as they impact developing countries. The journal 
of development studies, 46(9), 1628-1646. 
Herath, D., & Weersink, A. (2007). Peasants and plantations in the Sri Lankan tea 
sector: causes of the change in their relative viability. Australian Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics, 51(1), 73-89. 
Huang, S. W., & Gale, F. (2006). China's rising fruit and vegetable exports challenge 
US industries. USDA, Economic Research Service. 
IDE-UNIDO. (2013). Meeting Standards, Winning Markets Regional Trade Standards 
Compliance Report. 
Jayaratne, P. (2011). Sustainable Supply and Supply Chain Mapping-Sri Lankan Tea 
Supply Chain. 
Jongwanich, J. (2009). The impact of food safety standards on processed food exports 
from developing countries. Food Policy, 34(5), 447-457. 
MOFCOM (2009). Reports of Chinese agricultural export. Beijing: Ministry of 
Commerce of People’s Republic of China. 
Neeliah, S. A., & Goburdhun, D. (2010). Complying with the clauses of the SPS 
Agreement: Case of a developing country. Food control, 21(6), 902-911. 
27 
 
Otsuki, T., Wilson, J. S., & Sewadeh, M. (2001). Saving two in a billion:: quantifying 
the trade effect of European food safety standards on African exports. Food 
policy, 26(5), 495-514. 
Perera, P. (2014). Tea Smallholders in Sri Lanka: Issues and Challenges in Remote 
Areas. International Journal of Business and Social Science, 5(12). 
Sun, D., Sun, W. and Zhou, J. (2007). The impact of EU’s MRL standards on China’s 
tea exports. Journal of Agricultural Technical Economics 1:63-71. 
Chen, C., Yang, J., & Findlay, C. (2008). Measuring the effect of food safety standards 
on China’s agricultural exports. Review of World Economics, 144(1), 83-106. 
Shan, S., & Jiang. A. (2005). Analysis on the Comparative Advantage and Export 
Competity of China's Aquatic Products [J]. International Trade Journal, 5, 005. 
Wei, G., Huang, J., & Yang, J. (2012). The impacts of food safety standards on China's 
tea exports. China Economic Review, 23(2), 253-264. 
Xu, Y., & Gao, Q. (2006). Positive Analysis of the Effect of Technique Barriers on 
China's Tea Export [J]. Journal of International Trade, 5, 015. 
You, J.M. & Cui, Y. (2006). Considerations on the important and export trade of 
Chinese fruit. Guoji Maoyi Wenti (Jounal of International Trade). 6. 26-31 
 
 
28 
 
 
Figures and Tables 
Figure 1 Average applied tariff rate for selected countries and notifications (MRLs) for 
tea.  
 
Notes:  
1. Countries are Canada, China, Egypt, EU, Japan, Morocco, Pakistan, Russian 
Federation, United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. 
2. Figure is from FAO 2016. 
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Table 1 Reasons for rejections of herb and spice imports to the Australian market by country, 2003–2013. 
Country 
 
Reason for Rejection 
Total 
Labeling BC PR AM HC Additives VR OM Mycotoxins HM OC Other 
India 199 59 75 19 0             4 356 
China 129 13 9 10 0             9 170 
South Africa 48 5 0 12 0             1 66 
Sri Lanka 34 12 0 0 0             0 46 
United States 20 3 18 2 0             0 43 
Vietnam 28 4 1 0 0             3 36 
Malaysia 28 3 0 0 0             1 32 
Pakistan 27 1 1 1 0             0 30 
Bangladesh 20 8 0 1 0             0 29 
Papua New Guinea 13 0 0 0 0             15 28 
Spain 20 5 3 0 0             0 28 
Korea, South 23 1 0 3 0             0 27 
Thailand 12 4 4 2 1             1 24 
Indonesia 19 2 1 0 0             1 23 
Japan 11 1 3 0 0             0 15 
Notes: 
Abbreviations are applied due to limited table size:  
AM- Adulteration/missing documents; BC- Bacterial contamination; HC- Hygienic conditions/controls; HM- Heavy metals; OC- Other contaminants; OM- 
Other microbiological contaminants; PR- Pesticide residues; VR- Veterinary drug residues;  
 
30 
 
Table 2 Reasons for rejections of herb and spice imports to the EU Market, 2002–2013. 
Country 
 
Reason for Rejection Total 
Additives Mycotoxins PR BC OM OC HC AM HM Labeling Packaging VR Other  
India 134 299 305 48 7 8 6 5 0 0 1  4 817 
Thailand 13 7 78 196 6 0 0 1 0 0 0  3 304 
Turkey 114 16 4 38 6 0 1 0 1 0 0  2 182 
Vietnam 16 2 2 74 12 3 5 0 0 1 0  0 115 
China 34 15 0 12 6 5 1 3 3 1 0  17 97 
Pakistan 58 21 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 0  0 84 
Egypt 22 1 15 22 10 4 0 0 0 0 0  1 75 
Morocco 0 1 51 3 6 1 3 0 0 0 0  0 65 
Russia 53 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 54 
Indonesia 0 34 0 3 3 2 2 0 1 0 0  0 45 
Country of origin 
not mentioned 
32 6 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0  0 41 
Peru 3 33 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0  0 38 
Ghana 6 20 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0  0 30 
Brazil 0 5 3 9 1 1 0 1 0 0 0  2 22 
Sri Lanka 4 9 1 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 20 
Notes: 
Abbreviations are applied due to limited table size:  
AM- Adulteration/missing documents; BC- Bacterial contamination; HC- Hygienic conditions/controls; HM- Heavy metals; OC- Other contaminants; OM- 
Other microbiological contaminants; PR- Pesticide residues; VR- Veterinary drug residues;  
31 
 
Table 3 Reasons for rejections of herb and spice imports to the Japanese market by country, 2006–2013. 
Country 
 
Reason for Rejection 
Total 
PR Additives Mycotoxins HC BC OC VR AM Labeling Packaging OM HM Other 
India 37 17 12 0 1 0 0 0         0 67 
China 25 20 6 5 6 0 0 1         2 65 
Thailand 18 4 4 8 0 2 0 0         4 40 
Korea, South 7 4 0 3 1 1 2 0         0 18 
Sri Lanka 0 1 17 0 0 0 0 0         0 18 
United States 5 4 1 1 1 0 0 0         2 14 
Brazil 1 6 0 0 0 4 0 0         0 11 
Italy 1 5 1 2 0 0 0 0         0 9 
Vietnam 3 4 0 0 1 0 0 0         1 9 
Pakistan 2 0 3 1 0 1 0 0         0 7 
Peru 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 0         0 5 
China (Hong 
Kong) 
0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0         0 4 
Taiwan 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0         0 4 
Tunisia 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0         0 4 
Laos 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0         0 3 
Notes: 
Abbreviations are applied due to limited table size:  
AM- Adulteration/missing documents; BC- Bacterial contamination; HC- Hygienic conditions/controls; HM- Heavy metals; OC- Other contaminants; OM- 
Other microbiological contaminants; PR- Pesticide residues; VR- Veterinary drug residues; 
32 
 
Table 4 Reasons for rejections of herb and spice imports to the US market by country, 2002–2013. 
Country 
 
Reason for Rejection 
Total 
BC Labeling HC PR AM Additives OC HM Packaging VR Mycotoxins HM 
India 2358 729 683 656 85 273 6 1 1     2 4794 
Mexico 486 158 94 56 21 47 9 0 0     2 873 
Pakistan 314 81 43 0 35 13 0 0 0     0 486 
Canada 175 80 21 3 7 28 0 0 0     0 314 
Indonesia 48 41 10 0 185 6 0 0 0     0 290 
United Kingdom 6 196 3 0 20 34 0 0 0     0 259 
China 38 58 97 27 18 3 3 0 0     1 245 
Vietnam 116 51 28 12 4 6 0 0 0     3 220 
Thailand 63 31 44 21 17 7 0 0 0     0 183 
Italy 3 112 2 0 44 1 0 0 0     0 162 
Peru 8 28 35 83 3 4 0 0 0     0 161 
Bangladesh 73 65 5 0 0 10 0 0 0     0 153 
Sri Lanka 58 30 29 0 17 0 0 0 0     0 134 
Brazil 42 74 4 0 12 0 0 0 0     0 132 
Turkey 84 32 7 0 4 0 0 0 0     0 127 
Notes: 
Abbreviations are applied due to limited table size:  
AM- Adulteration/missing documents; BC- Bacterial contamination; HC- Hygienic conditions/controls; HM- Heavy metals; OC- Other contaminants; OM- 
Other microbiological contaminants; PR- Pesticide residues; VR- Veterinary drug residues; 
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Table 5 Australian imports of herbs and spices. 
Country 
 
Year Average 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
China 
(detention frequency/million USD imports) 2.27 2.56 6.03 6.78 2.95 0.50 2.05 1.35 1.01 0.92 0.31 2.56 
Sri Lanka 
(detention frequency/million USD imports) 10.94 4.52 5.99 2.80 6.85 0.00 0.00 1.82 3.15 2.85 1.78 4.52 
China 
(% of import value) 12.12 12.67 11.21 11.63 11.84 11.53 11.95 14.83 14.01 15.49 14.60 12.67 
Sri Lanka 
(% of import value) 1.01 2.29 1.35 1.82 2.55 2.47 2.31 3.38 2.04 2.69 4.47 2.29 
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Table 6 EU imports of herbs and spices. 
Country 
 
Year Average 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
China 
(detention frequency/million USD imports) 0.05 0.02 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.06 
Sri Lanka 
(detention frequency/million USD imports) 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.40 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.11 0.16 0.14 
China 
(% of import value) 5.94 6.53 8.31 9.58 9.15 10.60 12.02 11.66 13.68 14.30 12.40 14.97 11.60 
Sri Lanka 
(% of import value) 1.22 0.93 0.84 1.00 1.15 1.33 1.19 0.91 1.02 1.21 1.21 1.47 1.15 
 
35 
 
 
Table 7 Japanese imports of herbs and spices. 
 
Country 
Year 
Average 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
China (detention frequency/million USD imports) 0.14 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.05 
Sri Lanka (detention frequency/million USD imports) 8.75 4.18 2.66 8.53 5.58 1.13 1.13 0.91 4.11 
China (% of import value) 51.41 49.84 51.03 52.82 54.88 56.02 56.53 58.75 53.91 
Sri Lanka (% of import value) 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.16 
 
36 
 
 
Table 8 US imports of herbs and spices. 
Country 
 
Year Average 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
China 
(detention frequency/million USD imports) 0.19 0.32 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.13 
Sri Lanka 
(detention frequency/million USD imports) 1.35 0.58 0.16 1.10 0.93 2.33 0.63 1.09 0.30 0.00 0.05 0.21 0.73 
China 
(% of import value) 10.41 10.09 12.84 15.44 13.71 13.24 13.93 14.69 15.61 13.83 12.60 12.97 13.28 
Sri Lanka 
(% of import value) 1.22 0.84 0.84 1.10 1.50 1.32 1.25 0.99 1.54 1.25 1.50 1.49 1.24 
 
 
  
 
 
